Struct rustls::sign::CertifiedKey [−][src]
pub struct CertifiedKey {
pub cert: Vec<Certificate>,
pub key: Arc<Box<SigningKey>>,
pub ocsp: Option<Vec<u8>>,
pub sct_list: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}A packaged-together certificate chain, matching SigningKey and
optional stapled OCSP response and/or SCT.
Fields
cert: Vec<Certificate>
The certificate chain.
key: Arc<Box<SigningKey>>
The certified key.
ocsp: Option<Vec<u8>>
An optional OCSP response from the certificate issuer, attesting to its continued validity.
sct_list: Option<Vec<u8>>
An optional collection of SCTs from CT logs, proving the
certificate is included on those logs. This must be
a SignedCertificateTimestampList encoding; see RFC6962.
Methods
impl CertifiedKey[src]
impl CertifiedKeypub fn new(cert: Vec<Certificate>, key: Arc<Box<SigningKey>>) -> CertifiedKey[src]
pub fn new(cert: Vec<Certificate>, key: Arc<Box<SigningKey>>) -> CertifiedKeyMake a new CertifiedKey, with the given chain and key.
The cert chain must not be empty. The first certificate in the chain must be the end-entity certificate.
pub fn end_entity_cert(&self) -> Result<&Certificate, ()>[src]
pub fn end_entity_cert(&self) -> Result<&Certificate, ()>The end-entity certificate.
pub fn take_cert(&mut self) -> Vec<Certificate>[src]
pub fn take_cert(&mut self) -> Vec<Certificate>Steal ownership of the certificate chain.
pub fn has_ocsp(&self) -> bool[src]
pub fn has_ocsp(&self) -> boolReturn true if there's an OCSP response.
pub fn take_ocsp(&mut self) -> Option<Vec<u8>>[src]
pub fn take_ocsp(&mut self) -> Option<Vec<u8>>Steal ownership of the OCSP response.
pub fn has_sct_list(&self) -> bool[src]
pub fn has_sct_list(&self) -> boolReturn true if there's an SCT list.
pub fn take_sct_list(&mut self) -> Option<Vec<u8>>[src]
pub fn take_sct_list(&mut self) -> Option<Vec<u8>>Steal ownership of the SCT list.
pub fn cross_check_end_entity_cert(
&self,
name: Option<DNSNameRef>
) -> Result<(), TLSError>[src]
pub fn cross_check_end_entity_cert(
&self,
name: Option<DNSNameRef>
) -> Result<(), TLSError>Check the certificate chain for validity:
- it should be non-empty list
- the first certificate should be parsable as a x509v3,
- the first certificate should quote the given server name (if provided)
These checks are not security-sensitive. They are the server attempting to detect accidental misconfiguration.
Trait Implementations
impl Clone for CertifiedKey[src]
impl Clone for CertifiedKeyfn clone(&self) -> CertifiedKey[src]
fn clone(&self) -> CertifiedKeyReturns a copy of the value. Read more
fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)1.0.0[src]
fn clone_from(&mut self, source: &Self)Performs copy-assignment from source. Read more
Auto Trait Implementations
impl Send for CertifiedKey
impl Send for CertifiedKeyimpl Sync for CertifiedKey
impl Sync for CertifiedKey